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Studies have shown a direct link between memory for emotionally salient experiences 
and false memories. In particular, emotionally arousing material of negative and positive 
valence enhanced reality monitoring compared to neutral material since emotional stim-
uli can be encoded with more contextual details and thereby facilitate the distinction 
between presented and imagined stimuli. Individuals with schizophrenia appear to be 
impaired in both reality monitoring and memory for emotional experiences. However, the 
relationship between the emotionality of the to-be-remembered material and false mem-
ory occurrence has not yet been studied. In this study, 24 patients and 24 healthy adults 
completed a false memory task with everyday episodes composed of 12 photographs 
that depicted positive, negative, or neutral outcomes. Results showed how patients with 
schizophrenia made a higher number of false memories than normal controls (p < 0.05) 
when remembering episodes with positive or negative outcomes. The effect of valence 
was apparent in the patient group. For example, it did not affect the production causal 
false memories (p > 0.05) resulting from erroneous inferences but did interact with plau-
sible, script consistent errors in patients (i.e., neutral episodes yielded a higher degree of 
errors than positive and negative episodes). Affective information reduces the probability 
of generating causal errors in healthy adults but not in patients suggesting that emotional 
memory impairments may contribute to deficits in reality monitoring in schizophrenia 
when affective information is involved.
Keywords: false memory, emotion, schizophrenia, scripts, inferences
inTrODUcTiOn
Cognitive deficits are core features of schizophrenia and their role is crucial, particularly in terms 
of prognosis and functional disability (1, 2). Among these, memory seems to be one of the most 
impaired cognitive functions, with deficits in semantic and episodic memories (3). Forgetting and 
memory distortions such as false memories have therefore received much attention (4–7). False 
memories are memories of an unexperienced event and are rather common in everyday life. Most 
importantly, false memories have contributed to our understanding of normal memory function, 
the importance of qualitative features during the encoding and retrieval of complex memories [e.g., 
Ref. (8)], memory failure in specific brain diseases [e.g., Ref. (9)], and clinically relevant memory 
distortions in certain patient populations [e.g., Ref. (10)].
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False Memories in healthy individuals
Many studies sustain that false memories depend on semantic 
elaboration since false memories tend to increase as the semantic 
elaboration of to-be-remembered information increases (11, 12). 
Moreover, studies on text comprehension have amply demon-
strated that when reading stories, people seek to identify factors 
that link characters and events [e.g., Ref. (13)] in order to achieve 
coherence. This search for coherence can lead to memory errors, 
and accordingly, false memories tend to increase as semantic 
processing, aimed at gaining coherence, increases just as they do 
when video content is involved (14, 15).
False memories also seem to interact with the affective content 
of presented material. Numerous studies have demonstrated that 
production of false memories is modulated by the emotional 
content of the stimuli [e.g., Ref. (12, 16, 17)] although effects are 
complex and contradictory. On the one hand, affective content 
reduces false memories since individuals tend to focus on affec-
tive content more than neutral content. This, in turn leads them to 
encode and remember affective information better. In particular, 
the decrease in false memories for affective information may 
be because false memories for emotional stimuli are encoded 
with more contextual details and thus facilitate the distinction 
between presented and imagined stimuli (18, 19). In fact, many 
studies have shown that affective content reduces false memories 
(18) and leads to monitoring accuracy (12, 20).
On the other, affective content leads to an increase in false 
memories due to heightened elaboration processes and is further 
complicated by the fact that positive and negative content also 
seem to produce different effects on memory (21–25). Indeed, 
studies on memory recognition have reported an increase in 
false alarms to emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. 
These researchers affirmed that affective information induces an 
attention bias that leads to both enhanced memory accuracy and 
increased the likelihood of recognizing an emotional stimulus 
regardless of prior exposure to it (16, 26, 27). Others affirm that 
false memories for affective content increase since emotions can 
also serve as organizational factors and can lead to conceptual 
relatedness. In general, the more stimuli are similar, the more they 
can be confused in memory. It particular, affective stimuli may 
also lead to confusion in memory and increase false memories 
for non-studied affective information since they are conceptually 
related in that they include emotions (28).
False Memories in schizophrenia Patients
More specifically, an increasing number of studies has begun 
investigating false memories in individuals diagnosed with schiz-
ophrenia [for a review, see Ref. (29)]. Results however, are mixed. 
In general, studies have shown how patients with schizophrenia 
are more prone to false memories than controls (30). Others, 
using recognition tasks following the presentation of lists of words 
phonetically or semantically associated with specific unpresented 
target words [the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) task (31)], 
found no differences in the production of false memories between 
patients and controls or, in some cases, controls actually made 
more errors than patients (32–34). Elvevåg et al. (32) found that 
patients with schizophrenia made more errors (i.e., remember 
responses) but fewer false recognition errors at recall and argued 
that the production of false memories in patients may reflect poor 
memory which makes these population not particularly prone to 
false recollections. More recently, studies found that patients with 
schizophrenia are particularly prone to imagination inflation 
effects. That is, when schizophrenia patients repeatedly imagine 
an action they often remember the action as carried out (35, 36). 
According to the Source Monitoring Framework (SMF) (20), 
these errors occur because imagined events, typically accompa-
nied by more operational attributes, are enriched with so many 
perceptual details that patients subsequently remember them as 
having been actually carried out. The same may happen when 
schizophrenia patients make inferences during story elaboration 
and lead them to make causal errors. Therefore, it is clear that 
research on false memories portray a complex pattern of memory 
errors in schizophrenia, indicating that different factors may dif-
ferently mediate memory distortions.
Finally, the possible interaction between the affective valence 
of to-be-remembered material on memory in general, and on 
false memories in particular, has not been extensively studied in 
patients with schizophrenia. In particular, studies that adopted 
recognition tasks have demonstrated that patients with schizo-
phrenia, just as normal individuals, show better performance 
for negative than positive words (37), while others found that 
patients remember positive events better than negative ones 
(38, 39). More recently, using the Remember/Know procedure, 
a number of studies found that patients with schizophrenia con-
sciously recognized (remember responses) more positive than 
negative stimuli (40, 41) and recalled more positive than negative 
autobiographical memories compared to normal controls (42). 
Less is known, instead, about the interplay between affective 
information and false memory in schizophrenia.
The present study aims to examine the production of false 
memories in a group of high-functioning patients with schizo-
phrenia and in a group of healthy adults in order to clarify mecha-
nisms underlying the elaboration of scripted everyday events and 
the implications of affective content. In fact, the effects of affective 
content on memory distortions may have critical clinical implica-
tions since affective false memories may give rise to psychotic 
symptoms including hallucinations and delusional thinking 
(43). Moreover, the elaboration of affective content may also 
offer insights into aspects of reality monitoring deficits, namely 
qualitative source encoding errors (e.g., difficulties in encoding 
source features that typically accompany external vs. internal 
events) typically shown by patients with schizophrenia.
To this end, we adopted a modified version of the paradigm 
originally proposed by Hannigan and Reinitz (44) and succes-
sively adapted by Toffalini et al. (17) and Mirandola et al. (45) to 
include affective (both negative and positive) as well as neutral 
information. This paradigm includes pictorial material represent-
ing daily routines designed to investigate two types of memory 
errors that can occur during script elaboration for coherence and 
comprehension, plausible, script consistent errors, and causal 
errors deriving from erroneous inferences.
Based on previous findings (30), we expected patients with 
schizophrenia to be more susceptible to false memories than 
healthy controls with both types of errors. With regards to the 
affective valence of the outcomes on memory, we expected 
TaBle 1 | neuropsychological and demographic characteristics of 
schizophrenia patients and healthy adults.
Test variable schizophrenia  
patients (24)
healthy  
adults (24)
M sD M sD
Age 42.43 6.85 40.63 6.66
Education (in years) 10.5 3.41 11.08 2.78
Digit span forward 4.58 1.31 5.00 1.59
Digit span backward 4.08 1.38 4.88 1.73
PANAS pos 29.05 4.90 31.25 3.23
PANAS neg 18.95 4.25 22.29 6.67
BPRS
Total 22.56 3.14
Positive symptoms 7.31 1.67
Negative symptoms 3.56 1.80
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healthy controls, in line with Mirandola et  al. (45), to show a 
general decrease in false alarms when exposed to episodes with 
affective outcomes compared to those with neutral outcomes. 
Although we did not make any specific predictions regarding 
errors in the patient group, given that schizophrenia patients gen-
erally do poorly in memory tasks and therefore are less prone to 
false memories, we may expect fewer errors in general. However, 
if schizophrenia patients show better memory performance in 
tasks that include affective information, we may find that false 
memories increase and be influenced by the affective valence of 
the outcome.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
Twenty-four schizophrenia patients and 24 healthy adults par-
ticipated in the study. Participants were matched for age, gender, 
working memory capacity, and mood. Table  1 presents demo-
graphic data. Schizophrenia patients were volunteers recruited 
from the outpatients consecutively attending the community 
mental health services. None of the patients had been hospital-
ized within the last 6 months. All patients were able to live in the 
community with their families or on their own without supervi-
sion for major life tasks. The schizophrenia group constitute a 
“stabilized outpatient” sample, based on their psychological 
and social functioning as measured by the Global Assessment 
of Functioning (GAF) Scale with a mean function score of 52.0 
(SD =  7.2). All participants in the schizophrenia group used 
antipsychotic medication with a mean dose in chlorpromazine 
equivalents of 380  mg/day. Diagnoses were made according to 
the DSM-IV criteria, as determined by the structured clinical 
interview for DSM-IV (SCID) (46) by a board certified attending 
research team of psychiatrists who were trained to a minimum 
interclass correlation of 0.80. Global psychiatric symptoms in 
patients were assessed through the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale 
[BPRS (47)]. All patients reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
visual and auditory acuity. Schizophrenia patients and healthy 
controls had comparable levels of education. All participants 
completed the forward and backward digit span of the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised [WAIS-R (48)]. The Positive 
and Negative Affective Schedule [PANAS (49)] was administered 
to assess current mood. Exclusion criteria for all participants 
included history of traumatic brain injury, epilepsy, developmen-
tal disorder, diagnosable current substance abuse dependence, or 
other known neurological condition. Written informed consent 
was obtained from all participants prior to participation. The 
present study is in accordance with the Helsinki declaration 
and was approved by the local Institutional Review Board at the 
University of Chieti.
Design
Our study adopted a 2(group: healthy adults vs. schizophrenia 
patients) × 2(type of error: plausible script vs. causal) × 3(valence: 
positive, negative, and neutral) mixed design.
Materials
We used nine episodes in our study. Episodes included waking up 
(i.e., typical morning routine before going to school), going shop-
ping (i.e., young boy going grocery shopping with his mother), 
dating/meeting a friend (boy and girl meeting in the park), bike 
trip (i.e., girl going on a bike trip in a downtown area), rock climb-
ing (i.e., boy climbing a wall), track competition (i.e., young girls 
getting ready for and performing a competition), coming back 
from a long trip (i.e., girl coming back by train from a trip and 
entering her home), playing games (i.e., video games in a bar), 
and a party (i.e., a girl welcoming guests and blowing out candles). 
Episodes were specifically designed to investigate two types of 
memory errors that can occur during elaboration for coherence 
and comprehension, and different affective outcomes (positive, 
negative, and neutral). Plausible errors (participants say “yes” to 
an unseen picture that represents a plausible action) are an index 
that participants actually processed the episodes and causal errors 
(participants say “yes” to an unseen picture inferred as the cause 
of the outcome of the episode) are an index of memory distor-
tions determined by the affective outcome of the episode.
In particular, each episode was composed of 15 colored 
photographs depicting young actors engaged in typical everyday 
activities. Twelve of the 15 pictures served to create the encoded 
episode. The remaining three served as plausible errors during 
the recognition phase. We created two versions of each episode 
so that targets and plausible script errors were counterbalanced 
across participants. We also created a single photograph depict-
ing a causal scene that could be inferred as the causal antecedent 
of the affective outcome for each episode.
In each episode, the 11th picture communicated the affective 
outcome of the episode. All of the other photographs were identi-
cal across the three affective versions of the episode. For example, 
the girl and bike on the ground and the driver, out of the car, with 
her hands on her head (negative), the bike at the entrance with 
the car already out of the entrance, and the girl getting off the bike 
(neutral), the girl getting off the bike and hugging a friend (posi-
tive) in the “bike” episode. Valence was counterbalanced across 
participants so that each participant saw three episodes for each 
affective outcome (Figure 1).
Eighteen independent judges rated valence and arousal levels 
of the pictures representing the negative, positive, and neutral 
outcomes using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) scale 
(50). Paired-samples t-tests showed that outcomes significantly 
differed: negative outcomes had lower valence (M  =  2.22, 
FigUre 1 | The bike episode.
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SD = 0.94), t(16) = 12.62, p < 0.001 and positive outcomes had 
higher valence (M = 7.67, SD = 0.79), t(16) = −15.04, p < 0.001, 
than neutral outcomes (M =  5.04, SD =  0.45). Furthermore, 
arousal was significantly higher in both negative (M  =  7.40, 
SD =  0.88), t(16) = −8.74, p <  0.001, and positive outcomes 
(M = 6.90, SD = 0.93), t(16) = −12.92, p < 0.001, than in neutral 
outcomes (M = 3.89, SD = 1.30). Finally, although arousal was 
slightly higher in the negative than in the positive outcomes, the 
difference did not reach significance, t(16) = 1.64, p = 0.12.
Lastly, five unassociated pictures were presented at the begin-
ning and five at the end of the encoding session to avoid primacy 
and recency effects. Episodes were not introduced by titles and 
there were no intervals between them.
For recognition, we used a unique sequence of 90 photographs 
composed of both old and new photographs. In particular, par-
ticipants saw eight photographs per episode, four old ones from 
the encoded episode, three new ones that were plausible with 
the episode, and one never seen causal photograph that could 
be inferred as a plausible causal antecedent for the outcome of 
the episode. They also saw 18 single photographs, 9 old and 9 
new. Photographs were presented randomly, irrespective of 
episode, with the constraint that participants never saw two 
causal photographs in subsequent positions and these were never 
in the first or last position, or to the slide immediately before 
the photograph depicting the affective outcome. All actors gave 
written informed consent to the original authors of the modified 
paradigm (17, 45) and these authors gave us permission to use 
the pictorial material.
Procedure
We tested all participants individually in two sessions. In the first 
session, we collected demographic information and administered 
psychological general screening tests. In the second session, 
participants completed the false memory experimental task. See 
Figure 1 for a graphical representation of stimuli presentation.
Encoding Phase
We told participants that they would see a series of photographs 
depicting young adults involved in different everyday activi-
ties and instructed them to pay close attention to each episode 
in order to understand what the episode was about for a later 
memory test. For each of the nine episodes, participants viewed 
12 photographs in a logical order; each slide remained on the 
computer screen for 2 s, followed by a 2-s blank slide. The overall 
duration of the encoding phase was approximately 9 min.
Recognition Phase
Participants complete a self-paced recognition task immediately 
after the encoding phase. For each image, participants were 
instructed to respond “yes” if they thought they had seen the 
image during the encoding phase, and “no” if they thought they 
had not.
resUlTs
accuracy
A preliminary analysis concerned accuracy. To this end, we 
calculated two separate accuracy scores, one for unassociated 
photographs and one for episode photographs. Accuracy scores, 
in both cases, were calculated as HITs–FA. For episode accuracy 
scores, false alarms were relative to the episodes regardless of 
the type of error. We found a significant main effect of group 
F(1,46) =  41.78, p <  0.001, η2 =  0.48 because schizophrenia 
patients were less accurate than controls with unassociated 
photographs (0.54 vs. 0.85). With regards to accuracy for 
TaBle 2 | Mean proportions (with sDs) of false alarms for valence, group, and type of error (plausible vs. causal error).
group Plausible errors causal errors
Pos neg neu Pos neg neu
Schizophrenia patients 0.34 (0.04) 0.32 (0.04) 0.51 (0.04) 0.54 (0.08) 0.50 (0.06) 0.53 (0.07)
Healthy adults 0.17 (0.04) 0.19 (0.04) 0.27 (0.04) 0.28 (0.08) 0.43 (0.06) 0.49 (0.07)
FigUre 2 | Mean proportion of false alarms by valence, group, and 
type of error.
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photographs, we found a significant main effect of group 
F(1,46) =  56.05, p <  0.001, η2 =  0.55 because schizophrenia 
patients were, in general, less accurate than controls with 
photographs (−0.05 vs. 0.41). The main effect of valence was 
also significant F(2,92) = 5.79, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.11. An analysis 
post  hoc LSD confirmed that participants were more accurate 
when the outcome of the episode was positive (0.24) or negative 
(0.21) with respect to when the outcome was neutral (0.09). There 
were no differences in accuracy for the episodes with positive or 
negative outcomes (p = 0.44).
Proportions of False Memories
The principal analysis concerned memory errors, calculated as 
mean proportions [as done in previous studies, e.g., Ref. (12, 
51)], in reporting new pictures as old. Table 2 shows the mean 
proportions of causal and plausible errors.
A 2(group: AD vs. controls) × 2(type of error: plausible vs. 
causal) × 3(valence of outcome: positive vs. negative vs. neutral) 
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the last two factors as 
within participant factors, on the proportions of false memory 
as the dependent measure, revealed a significant group effect, 
F(1,46) = 7.17, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.13 showing that schizophrenia 
patients made more errors than healthy controls. The main 
effect of type of error was also significant revealing that plausible 
errors were more frequent than causal errors, F(1,46) = 19.82, 
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.30. The main effect of valence of consequence 
was significant F(2,92) = 8.82, p < 0.001, η2 = 16. Post hoc LSD 
tests revealed how, in general, participants made more errors 
when the episode contained a neutral outcome compared to 
a positive (p <  0.001) or negative outcome (p <  0.01). There 
were no differences between errors in the negative and posi-
tive outcome episodes. The effect was specified by a significant 
3-way interaction, F(2,92) =  3.20, p <  0.05, η2 =  0.07. LSD 
post hoc comparisons revealed that neutral plausible errors were 
more frequent than affective ones in schizophrenia patients 
(p < 0.01) whereas there were no differences between affective 
and neutral causal errors. Differently, in controls, LSD post hoc 
comparisons revealed that there were no differences between 
neutral and affective plausible errors while neutral (p < 0.001) 
and negative (p < 0.05) causal errors were more frequent than 
positive ones (Figure 2).
Last, we used Pearson’s correlations, as typically done in 
studies regarding schizophrenia patients and false memories, in 
order to exclude possible correlations between false memories, 
clinical symptoms, and antipsychotic medication (chlorproma-
zine equivalent) that would confound results. No significant 
correlations were observed between chlorpromazine equivalent 
and false memories (plausible and causal errors; all >0.05).
DiscUssiOn
The aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of affec-
tive information on false memory in patients with schizophrenia. 
To our knowledge, this study is one of the first to investigate affec-
tive false memories in a group of patients with schizophrenia. The 
main results of the present study can be summarized as follows. 
As expected, schizophrenia patients generally made more errors 
than healthy controls but both groups made fewer errors when 
episodes contained affective outcomes, consistent with the results 
of many studies that show how affectively charged material is 
remembered with fewer distortions than neutral material (18, 
25, 45). Moreover, the pattern of false memories as a function 
of the affective outcome of the episode and type of error differed 
between patients and controls. Plausible errors in patients with 
schizophrenia were lower for episodes with affective outcomes 
compared to neutral ones while they showed a similar pattern 
of causal errors across all episodes. Differently, healthy controls 
showed similar patterns of plausible errors across all episodes 
but a lower number of causal errors for episodes with positive 
outcomes compared to negative and neutral ones.
Our findings suggest that general emotional enhancement 
effects in memory may be relatively intact in both healthy adults 
and patients with schizophrenia. In fact, both groups made fewer 
errors when the episodes contained affective outcomes compared 
to neutral ones. One reason for this may be that individuals may 
more easily reject non-presented information associated with an 
emotionally relevant episode, due to increased distinctiveness of 
the scenes presented during the study phase of the experiment 
(18, 52). Moreover, patients with schizophrenia produced a 
higher number of plausible and causal errors to episodes than 
6Fairfield et al. Affective False Memories
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controls. These findings contrast with results from recent stud-
ies that found lower levels of both memory accuracy and false 
memories in schizophrenia patients than normal participants 
when using non-emotional stimuli and suggest that the produc-
tion of false memories in patients may not simply reflect poor 
memory (32, 53). If memory dysfunction in schizophrenia is 
primarily a reflection of episodic memory deficits, one would 
expect a higher number of false memories as memory accuracy 
for presented information increases. However, in the present 
study, we found a lower number of false memories (plausible 
and casual errors), despite poor recognition in the patient group. 
Thus, our results cannot be explained as a reflection of a relative 
increase in memory accuracy in patients with schizophrenia.
In addition, most of the research that has investigated schizo-
phrenic patients’ susceptibility to false memories used non-emo-
tional words or sentences as stimuli. It is, therefore, conceivable 
that apparent differences between our results and those from 
previous studies may reflect differences in the stimuli used. Our 
results are in line with existing evidence suggesting that affective 
information may both heighten memory accuracy and, in some 
circumstances, favor the endorsement of non-experienced events 
(16, 26). These findings suggest that the higher number of causal 
errors in patients may be partially due to a fundamental deficit 
in executive processes (i.e., breakdown in attentional–inhibi-
tory control). Recent studies have suggested that an interaction 
between frontal executive cognitive control circuits and limbic 
processing systems sub-serves a critical function in the regulation 
of attention in the presence of emotionally arousing information. 
For instance, stimuli that engage frontal executive cognitive con-
trol circuits simultaneously induce deactivation or suppression 
of limbic cortical regions (54, 55). Increasing evidence indicates 
that individuals with schizophrenia may engage such inhibitory 
processes for shorter durations, resulting in poor frontal control 
when elaborating affective stimuli (56). Patients with executive 
dysfunctions in our study may fail to suppress highly activated 
episode relevant pictures (e.g., pictures of events that typically 
occur in a given type of episode) and inferences and consequently 
incorporate these pictures when remembering.
Another way to account for the higher number of causal 
errors observed in the group of patients refers to the SMF (20). 
According to the SMF, memory for specific perceptual attributes 
experienced during an event indicates something actually seen or 
encoded. Conversely, the lack of perceptual details may indicate 
that an item was generated internally. Source decision then, 
can be made by considering the absence of memory for certain 
details according to an if–then strategy (i.e., if I would have seen 
it I would have remembered it). Interestingly, when an imagined 
event is rich in sensory and contextual information (qualitative 
features that typically belong to external events), participants 
may believe that the event really happened (57). Here, the higher 
number of causal errors in patients compared to controls indi-
cates that patients make inferences as they experience emotional 
events. Subsequently, these inferences might be misremembered 
as previously experienced components of the encoded episode, 
probably because the imagined events were so rich in sensory 
and contextual information and virtually undistinguishable from 
those scenes presented during study. This study complements a 
previous study carried out in our lab that showed that the sus-
ceptibility to false memories might be a reflection of imagination 
inflation effects in patients with schizophrenia (35). In this latter 
study, participants imagined the event so vividly that they were 
led to believe that the event had truly occurred, although it did 
not suggest that patients may have difficulties in modulating 
overlearned behaviors. Interestingly, it has been suggested that 
“over mentalizing,” that is over generating hypothesis about oth-
ers’ mental life may represent a specific deficit in schizophrenic 
patients with positive symptoms (58). It is possible that these 
individuals may have difficulty controlling highly activated inter-
pretations by over attributing mental states and, thus, produce a 
higher number of false memories. Further studies are needed to 
conclude a casual association between this Theory of Mind error 
type and the development of false memories.
It is also possible that patients may have inferred source infor-
mation based on snap judgments (59). If so, the higher number 
of inferential errors in patients may indicate that patients jump to 
conclusions and often rely on partial information when accepting 
an item as having been studied compared to controls (60).
Concerning the influence of affective valence on memory 
performance, we observed a lower number of causal errors in 
controls when episodes contained a positive outcome compared 
to a negative one, whereas patients with schizophrenia exhibited 
similar number of causal errors in both positive and negative 
episodes. The memory advantage for episodes with positive 
outcomes in controls replicates previous findings from studies 
conducted on normal participants showing that positive events 
may protect individuals from making false memories (38, 39). 
Previous studies conducted on patients with schizophrenia found 
that patients recognized more positive than negative pictures, and 
recalled more positive than negative autobiographical memories 
than controls (37, 42). However, our results are consistent with 
another study conducted by Kayton and Koh (61) in which, con-
trary to controls, patients recalled unpleasant words and pleasant 
words equally well, indicating an emotionally undifferentiated 
recall. It is possible that the patients in our study had trouble 
remembering specific perceptual characteristics of stimuli due 
to executive deficits and accordingly showed a higher number of 
false memories for both negative and positive emotional events. 
Recently, a number of studies have investigated the effects of psy-
chostimulant and psychotropic drugs on true and false memories 
in healthy volunteers (62). Although the results in those studies 
are mixed and inconsistent, there is some suggestion that false 
memories are more susceptible to drug effects than the true ones 
(63). This information is clinically important for patients with 
schizophrenia who use psychotropic medications. Particularly, 
Guarnieri et al. (64) found that sulpiride, a selective dopamine 
D2 antagonist, did not affect remembered stimuli (emotional and 
non-emotional) but heightened false recognition only for emo-
tionally charged items (positive and negative) and not neutral 
ones. Therefore, it could be argued that, at least in part, the higher 
number of false memories in our patients might be related to the 
effects of antipsychotic drugs. However, this is not the case. If the 
higher number of false memories for emotionally charged items 
is primarily a reflection of the effects of psychotropic medication, 
one might expect more causal errors for episodes with affective 
7Fairfield et al. Affective False Memories
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outcomes compared to neutral ones, while our patients showed 
a similar pattern of causal errors across all episodes. Moreover, 
we did not find significant correlations between chlorpromazine 
equivalent and emotional false memories.
Finally, the current study has some limitations. In the present 
study, we did not use the Remember/Know procedure. Previous 
research investigating the different states of awareness accompa-
nying inferred-based memory errors provided evidence that the 
underlying memory processes that give rise to plausible errors are 
fundamentally different from those that give rise to errors based 
on causal inference. Specifically, plausible errors may be based 
on a feeling of familiarity in the absence of explicit recognition 
and may result from the activation of high-schema-relevant items 
(e.g., events that typically occur in a given type of episode). Causal 
errors, instead, result from specific inferential processes [e.g., 
diagnostic processes that function to attribute effects to likely 
causes (65, 66)]. In the light of this, our findings are contrary to 
those found in a series of studies that investigated the influence 
of emotion on autonoetic awareness in schizophrenia. Indeed, 
these studies found no difference between remember and know 
responses when affective stimuli were involved (40, 41). Future 
studies need to adopt this type of procedure to investigate 
whether patients with schizophrenia show the same pattern of 
performance when using complex information such as pictorial 
episodes.
In sum, in this study we found that schizophrenia patients make 
a higher number of false memories when episodes lack affective 
information, especially for new plausible information. Further, in 
terms of causal false memories, affective information reduces the 
probability of generating causal errors in healthy adults but not 
in patients suggesting that emotional memory impairments may 
contribute to deficits in reality monitoring in schizophrenia when 
emotional information is involved.
We interpret this finding as reflecting a breakdown in atten-
tional–inhibitory control due to decreased efficiency in cognitive 
control processes mediated by frontal systems, reported previ-
ously in schizophrenia. Our results suggest that individuals with 
schizophrenia may experience difficulty differentiating between 
the effects of valence, which determine the salience of an event 
and, consequently, patients may be more likely to erroneously 
recognize previous events when these events have emotional 
content.
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